Approaching US gun culture sociologically also allows social science research to dissect political divisions surrounding US firearm ownership and policy, as well as how attitudes about guns have been shaped—and manipulated—by gun manufacturers and the corporate gun lobby in ways that then carry profound implications for public health.
For instance, social scientists have begun to study the complex social meanings ascribed to firearms within progun communities. Here, guns convey familiarity and custom. Guns also connote connection to neighbors, or notions of cultural heritage. Loyalty to guns is often not just personal or familial—it represents brand loyalty as well. Social scientists have begun to analyze ways that the NRA and gun manufacturers are uniquely effective at constructing markets for guns through appeals to an imagined past.
For instance, the NRA long promoted guns through myths of settlers and cowboys who tamed the Wild West, guns in hand. Present-day social scientists expand on gendered associations of firearms in important ways. Sociologists have been at the fore of shifting understandings of guns and gun violence away from misleading stereotypes of mental illness and toward recognition of the roles of gender and masculinity. Eric Madfis reads the male gender—mass shooter connection to cultural standards dictating how men are expected to react to stress.
As one example, advertisers in their efforts to sell more guns adroitly tapped into working-class feelings of gendered disempowerment and resentment about globalization, immigration, or coastal elites who cast the middle of the country as one big flyover state.
Social science research also addresses the complex associations between attitudes about guns and stereotypes of race. Rather, white gun owners imagined these encounters based on anxieties about persons of color. In such stories, gun ownership became a defense of internalized notions of racial order as well as about external personal safety.
Society responds differently when gun owners are not white. My current research studies how the US political establishment mobilized to disarm African American gun owners in the s and s. This history lay the groundwork for differing responses to white versus African American open carry proponents in the present day.
Frequently, mainstream society codes white men carrying weapons in public as patriots, while identifying armed black men as criminals. Quantitative and qualitative expertise would also allow researchers to address nuanced questions that are both counterintuitive and self-evident. What common characteristics define the vast majority of gun owners who never discharge their guns in public settings, and whose names do not show up on morbidity databases? What are the psychological benefits of owning a gun?
What assumptions about guns or gun owners shape attitudes about firearms among liberal non-gun-owners? In asking and attempting to answer such questions, social science research can also provide deeper understandings of the ways Americans talk, and often talk past one another, about broader tensions and divisions signified by guns.
And it also involves asking difficult questions about what kind of society we create when we divide so readily into pro- or anti-, red or blue. To be clear, guns injure and kill tens of thousands of people each year in the United States, and many of these injuries and fatalities are preventable. However, social science illustrates the benefits and potential drawbacks of framing gun-related morbidity as an epidemic or a public health crisis. While doing so rightly calls attention to a dire need for intervention, it also limits recognition of the deeper biases and fissures that shape what guns mean, and what they come to represent.
Guns may well signify a public health crisis in the present-day United States. But guns signal a social crisis as well. He is also research director of the Safe Tennessee Project , a grassroots organization committed to addressing gun violence in the state. Social Science Research Council. The SSRC is an independent, international, nonprofit organization. Our countersurveillance, countertargeting, and close-in soft-kill systems become as critical as our hard-kill systems. For the past forty years, the cost-effective way to provide both offensive and defensive capabilities at sea has been to leverage economies of scale by placing as much multimission capability as possible in a ship hull.
Once deployed to, say, the Central Command area of operations, this DDG can conduct counterpiracy activities in the morn- ing, then relocate on short notice to mount theater ballistic-missile defense in the afternoon. It is versatile, fast, and multifunctional. Operationally, it is limited only by its draft. But these ships also are limited by their expense. Plus, if a war starts and we begin to lose them, replacement time will be problematic.
But if we consider distributed lethality and the advantage of the offense, combined with advances in unmanned systems, autonomy, and longer-range, smarter missiles, a new op- portunity for an economical fleet mix emerges. The adversary cannot disregard our threat of offensive force to focus on attacking our interests while we have placed the best multimission ships to defend those interests.
This is distributed lethality combined with smart defense. Offensive antiship missiles are becoming smarter and our adversaries have learned to employ them in various ways: from shore, shipping containers, bombers, and missile boats. Our own offensive fleet could be just as versatile, composed of missile corvettes paired with missile-equipped LASVs working in coordination with undersea systems and long-range bombers armed with hypersonic missiles.
The objective of the components of this force is to close silently and deceptively; deliver their missiles, torpedoes, mines, or cyber pack- ages; then retire or, if unmanned, stay as a reconnaissance node, if desired. In a calculus of value, a commander is more willing to risk what he or she values less; the more so when its capabilities nonetheless enjoy his or her confidence.
Our traditional fleet primarily will fill the role of the protective force, using strike when necessary to kill threats advancing toward our SLOCs. This concept is an operational expression of tactics that Arleigh Burke devel- oped during the Solomons campaign. Commodore Burke championed sending the small, maneuverable destroyers ahead of the battle line to conduct coordi- nated torpedo attacks. As the sea-control force evolves through retirement of the top-end multimis- sion platforms, it too will become more tailored by employing the latest tech- nology to counter specific threats, although, by the nature of its purpose, it will remain multimission in character.
For example, theater ASW ships still will be required to protect themselves from submarine-launched antiship cruise mis- siles, and escort duty will require some form of area defense from all threats. During more-peaceful times, the offensive force can fill peacetime constabu- lary duties and engagement exercises in forward regions. But dividing a force into offense and protective defense elements is a war strategy, not a peacetime maritime security strategy.
As a result, the new, offensively disposed force provides a stronger deterrence. The evolution to a tailored fleet from our current force will be more effective and less expensive than simply adding offensive capability to each new ship built in a total multimission force. Such a fleet provides a way to distribute offensive lethality economically and to distribute de- fense efficiently. Making the offensive force both lethal and sufficiently resilient to ensure its deterrent credibility is addressed next.
Army chief: You want a new pistol? Send me to Cabela's with $17 million
But, in this model, what now is a capital ship? Under the traditional definition, it is the most heavily armed and powerful warship, one of the first rank in size and armament. However, if the main conveyance of naval power is defeated, so is the Navy. Capital ships can be viewed as a naval center of gravity.
History of IAF
In a network of manned and unmanned systems, the network becomes the naval center of gravity—and therefore a target of interest to an adversary. Information will be ubiquitous and accessible to all sensor and weapon operators via a web construct, linked through various methods of mesh networks, burst transmissions, and traditional communication channels resis- tant to enemy jamming and interference. It will enable distributed operations or massing of fires across all domains, including the human domain. It provides the surveillance and information advantage needed to employ long-range weapons before an adversary does.
This web fires concept will be enriched by the use of unmanned systems, smart weaponry, and autonomy. Then the fighting starts. How battle resilient the web fires and distributed forces will be depends on the technology that enables them; on the C2 and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and tactical philosophy envisioned when the elements are built; and on the sailors who operate them. The United States cannot be assured of technological superiority in the future, so our Navy must retain war-fighting methods that do not assume assurance of continuous information to all elements of the force.
Web fires and a distributed force to be used as the offensive or sea-denial force should be built from the bottom up, not from the top down, meaning that, if necessary, every manned node in the web can act independently as a scout, commander, and shooter within its own area of responsibility.
This decentralized execution is not a new concept for U. The offensive force will be network enabled, not network dependent. In a fight, the force net- work leverages a strategy of accelerated cumulative warfare, relying on individual engagements to create the desired emerging operational and strategic effects. This foundational philosophy turns the focus to tactical offense, reorients acquisition from platforms to weapons kinetic and nonkinetic , and accelerates employment of technologies in missiles and ro- botics.
Af- ter a play is called, each player proceeds to his assigned area, with full knowledge of his role in the called play. No communication is required after the ball is hiked. Although everyone has a role, each, if necessary, also can carry the football, run for a touchdown, or tackle. If the quarterback views new information after the play is called, a short audible at the line may change the play. Employment of the offensive fleet in a distributed force is similar.
If an audible is called, it can be communicated through brief signals in code along short-burst, mesh-network paths.
We also would need a concept of employment, operations, doctrine, and tactics for the force architecture—a force design. These types of studies are conducted cycli- cally, with the most recent set requested by Congress and delivered to it in In lieu of a detailed quantitative assessment, a subjective overview of the concepts will be discussed using more-strategic metrics.
Although many metrics could be selected to assess alternative future naval force structures, as its strategic litmus tests this analysis will use reactivity, robustness, and resilience. Resilience is a subset of robustness, and is similar to the concepts addressed in current Navy staff analyses conducted to assess programmed fleet capabilities.
Missile seekers, sensors, software, and unmanned systems can be replaced or modified, tested, corrected, retested, and introduced into the fleet with fewer challenges than a multimission destroyer. For example, when a DDG is in dry dock availability, the fleet loses all its mission areas. In contrast, when a single-mission platform is undergoing maintenance, the fleet loses only that one mission. In addition, numerous smaller platforms allow a greater por- tion of the fleet to be forward deployed while the remaining force is being up- dated in rear areas.
These can change faster than the capital-intensive, long-lived, multimission ships and submarines of our programmed force. For brevity, only general observations are made here. Our current programmed force is heavily invested in complex multimission platforms that employ advanced technologies, mainly in defense. Although any robust U. In addition, if the fleet is successful in deterring the very-high-end conflicts for which these platforms are built, those platforms may find themselves conducting missions for which they are not well suited, such as when cruisers conduct counterpiracy operations.
Adding to the mix more smaller platforms, both manned and unmanned, is a cost-effective way to provide policy makers with design op- tions for fleet employment, reconfiguration, and basing. A core portion of the fleet comprising long-lived, multimission ships remains dedicated to exercising sea control, while the offensive sea-denial force composed of smaller, less expen- sive systems may grow or diminish as the national strategy and available national treasure vary.
The ability of the fleet to sustain damage yet continue to operate in a contested environment against an adversary may be achieved in two major ways: build in a vigorous damage-containment design through redundancy and compartmentation in individual platforms, or have many platforms. Scientific community of both nations cooperate in joint radiation experiment, space components development and space education. The Indo-French Centre for Promotion of Advanced Research CEFIPRA is the nodal framework for promoting bilateral scientific cooperation in fundamental and applied research, frontier technologies and exchange of scientists and post doctoral researchers.
As part of the Silver Jubilee celebrations, a number of programmes have been envisaged; these include holding of seminars, organising science quiz in schools and screening of documentary films. Pasteur Institute in Coonoor , Tamil Nadu which opened on 6 April is one of the oldest vaccine manufacturing public sectors enterprises in India.
Collaborative efforts to preserve heritage buildings  and Vedic literature     in former French establishments in India has received popular appreciation among Indian populace and served to promote French technical expertise in restoration of monuments and documents. Indian culture enjoys a wide and discerning audience among the French population, as is evident in the numerous and frequent cultural events organised all over France, spanning the entire gamut of Indian art, music, dance, cinema and literature. While the Indian Council for Cultural Relations ICCR sponsors visits of Indian artists to France as also exchange of students in the field of culture and art, there is a growing number of private impresarios who organise cultural events throughout France.
A significant number of Indian artists are therefore giving performances in France regularly on a commercial basis or at the initiative of the various local cultural associations outside the purview of the official exchanges. The month-long Indian cultural festival- "Namaste France" was held from 14 April to 28 June It was successful in terms of putting India on the cultural radar of France. On the same day, a MOU was signed between the Ministry of Culture of India and the Louvre Museum with the aim of establishing an active partnership in the area of exchange of competencies and expertise, particularly in the field of museology , temporary exhibitions and other cultural events.
The Cannes Film Festival was important for India. India is going to celebrate years of Indian cinema in Two decades later, Bonjour India came back with a bang in , and by it grew into more and more collaborations.
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Scaling up in its third edition, Bonjour India is a four-month-long mega voyage across India that will celebrate Indo-French partnership as well as shape the next decade of human exchange between the two countries. Bonjour India provides a platform for enduring partnerships highlighting Indo-French innovation and creativity across the themes of Smart Citizen, High Mobility, Go Green. Martin about Indians living in France have access to French social security protection and services through an agreement concluded in The French in India are predominantly the remnants of the French presence in India,    which began in with the establishment of French India and continued until when the French territory was formally transferred to India.
The French presence was minor compared to the British and was generally ignored. There were 12, French nationals residing in India in Economic migration from France has resulted in the rise of skilled French expatriates in the urban population centres of Bangalore , Chennai , Hyderabad , Pune , Mumbai and New Delhi.
The French government had undertaken steps to strengthen Franco-Indian institutional and people-to-people ties. Indian Citizenship Act of the Constitution of India forbids dual nationality. Foreigners who possess Overseas Citizenship of India OCI continue to benefit consular protection from their country of nationality. In June , locally employed contractual staff at the French Consulate in Pondicherry stopped work to protest against wage discrimination. The tendency of French social academics to over emphasise the importance of the caste system for all matters pertaining to India has made French people prone to explaining away India via the caste system.
Social studies conducted by French researchers are prone to emphasise on the lacunae of India's economy rather than achievements and improvements in the sphere of poverty reduction, health-care, education, etc. The morbid fascination of European tourists with Hindu cremation rituals is perceived as lack of sensitivity besides being a gross invasion of privacy. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Diplomatic relations between the French Republic and the Republic of India. See also: World War I casualties. Main article: Foreign policy of Narendra Modi. Main article: Foreign relations of India.
See also: India—European Union relations. Main article: French India. The Hindu.
David Edgerton, Liberal Militarism and the British State, NLR I/, January–February
Britain As A Military Power, Deccan Herald. Figures include identified burials and those commemorated by name on memorials. Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Archived from the original PDF on 18 June Retrieved 7 September Times of India. Retrieved 24 October Retrieved 2 November Royal Museums Greenwich. National Maritime Museum. Archived from the original on 24 December Retrieved 4 November France Retrieved 21 November Retrieved 8 October Archived from the original on 22 November BBC News.
Hindu Business Line. Economic Times. Hindustan Times. Radio France International.
Social Science and the Future of Gun Research
The Diplomat. Deutsche Welle. Wall Street Journal.