Scenario 2, Slowing but Growing, assumes that the economy goes through a downturn marked by instability and that future growth in travel demand is lower than in the first scenario.
CNREC and IEA compare scenarios for China’s energy system revolution
By making potential long-term mobility futures more vivid, the aim is to help decisionmakers at different levels of government and in the private sector better anticipate and prepare for change. Johanna Zmud , Liisa Ecola , et al. Liisa Ecola , Charlene Rohr , et al. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete.
Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Research Question What might the future of mobility be in China in ? West Asia — from Iran to the Eastern Mediterranean — appears to be an independent sub-system of international relations developing according to its own laws and requires a separate matrix. Even if we exclude the Middle East, which is hugely important for the region, Asia remains a far greater, far more complex, and far more fragmented continent than Europe.
Nonetheless, we might suppose that development of international relations in Asia in the coming years will be largely determined by two basic factors. First, the dynamic of correlation between the economic, academic, technological, military, strategic, and political potentials of China and the US.
The general tendency here is obvious: over at least the last three decades, the balance of power has been steadily shifting toward China. There is no reason to believe that this tendency will change in the near future. Of course, the process is not linear: accelerations, decelerations, halts and even backward movements are possible, This is especially true of the military, strategic, and political components of a national power, as they are less prone to inertia and are more flexible than the economic, academic, and technological components.
However, maintaining this balance in the near future is far from guaranteed. Combining the horizontal axis which records the changing balance of power between China and the US with the vertical one which measures the correlation between elements of collaboration and conflict in international relations in Asia , we get a matrix of four development scenarios for China-US relations and for the international system on the Asian continent as a whole.
Naturally, this matrix is highly schematic and in no way exhausts all the development possibilities of international relations in Asia. Nonetheless, it can serve as a starting point for more comprehensive and more complete scenario forecasts concerning the future of the Asian continent. In this scenario, the US is able to slow down or suspend entirely those changes to the balance of power between China and the US that are negative for the US.
The economic pressure Washington consistently puts on Beijing bears fruit. The deficit in US-China trade decreases significantly. Trump succeeds in wringing concessions out of China on other fronts as well currency exchange rates, non-tariff restrictions, intellectual property, etc.
Choose your subscription
At the same time, military political tensions on the Asian continent generally deescalate. Pyongyang freezes its nuclear and ballistic programs and the North Korean conflict gradually becomes less critical. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea remain unresolved, but they do not provoke bitter political crises in Southeast Asia. The US returns to the idea of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, taking into account new bilateral economic and trade agreements already signed with partners in the Asia Pacific. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership promoted by China is stalled by numerous multilateral and bilateral disputes on specific issues.
Political extremism and international terrorism in Asia are on a downward trend. This scenario means preserving and, in some areas, bolstering American influence in Asia. Traditional American allies remain loyal to Washington even though they actively develop economic collaboration with China. US—China cooperation continues and expands in the G1.
- A Christmas Story.
- SLIDING DOWN THE BANISTERS OF LIFE;
- Share this page.
- Watch on the Rhine: Die Wacht am Rhein (Legacy of the Aldenata Book 7)!
It is even possible that the US and China will reach some agreements on nuclear arms control, although the US has a decisive nuclear advantage particularly in sea- and air-based nuclear strategic forces. On the other hand, the US continues to put pressure on China on such issues as human rights, civil society development, and Internet freedom.
This pressure resonates with certain groups within China, particularly among educated urban youth and the growing Chinese middle class. On the other hand, China achieves major successes in structural revamping of its economy without sacrificing either sociopolitical stability or its high growth rate. China takes the place of the US as the chief proponent of free trade in Asia and in the world in general.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership steadily progresses; the free trade zone in Asia extends beyond its original geographic boundaries and gradually turns into a continent-wide integration project. A major military political crisis in Beijing-Washington relations is avoided; territorial and border conflicts gradually become less of an issue; the logic of economic interdependence wins over that of the geopolitical balance of power. China—India cooperation is primarily economic but gradually spreads into the political. At the same time, additional risks emerge for Russia owing to Beijing possibly revising its economic and strategic priorities in favor of South Asia at the expense of Russia and Central Asia.
Since Washington loses positions in continental Asia, it has to rely mostly on its traditional allies on the periphery of the Asian continent, from Japan to Australia. With each passing year, these traditional allies find it increasingly hard to combine their pro-American military and political orientation with an economic reorientation toward China and the consolidation of Asia as a whole.
The scenario is based on preserving US hegemony on the continent as in the first scenario , but under a significantly escalated military political situation in Asia.
Increasing socioeconomic problems in most Asian countries, including China and India, lead to a rise in nationalism and political radicalism. Border conflicts and other territorial problems become the focus of national priorities, and populists bolster their positions in both democratic and authoritarian states on the continent. The arms race in Asia proceeds on an ever greater scale. Numerous attempts to agree on multilateral confidence-building military measures fail.
Four scenarios of China's R&I landscape in - Paris Innovation Review
From time to time, the continent is rocked by critical political crises and border clashes. Plans for economic unification of Asia fail under the onslaught of protectionism and bitter fights for resources. Chronic political instability, separatist movements, religious conflicts, and numerous terrorist attacks prevent major infrastructural projects from being implemented on the continent. Instead of developing a single Asian economic space, most Asian states in their trade and economic strategies are oriented toward external markets North America and Europe.
Asian countries are locked in a fierce struggle over US and EU markets, allowing the West to secure profitable terms of trade with the East. India is the principal, though not the only, counterbalance to China, and enters into a de-facto alliance with the US or even becomes a de-jure American ally.
Shipments of US arms to Asian countries increase. Bilateral and multilateral agreements with old US allies are renewed. The fourth scenario entails a simultaneous rise of China as in the second scenario and a general slump in socioeconomic, military, and political stability in Asia as in the third scenario. Growing challenges to national security in Asian countries make it increasingly difficult to preserve the freedom of political maneuver, and the countries face a harsh choice between Beijing and Washington.
Like the Soviet-American bipolar world of the 20th century, this new bipolarity gradually establishes new rules of the game acceptable to both parties, adopting the requisite agreements and generating new mechanisms for arms control. The Japan-China confrontation will not only be preserved, butwill gain additional impetus. It is hard to say how the new bipolarity will work in a globalized and interdependent world. Will the parties succeed in separating economic collaboration from political confrontation?
Will they agree on joint approaches to global problems? Today, hardly anyone is ready to offer answers to these questions. One thing is clear: the new bipolarity of the 21st century would, in any case, be less stable and dangerous than the old bipolarity of the past century. It would apparently, sooner or later, evolve toward one of the three preceding scenarios. Several such events may be mentioned in creating a forecast for the Asian continent. A large-scale military conflict in Asia.
Although such a conflict does not appear particularly probable, the possibility cannot be entirely discounted. Intentionally, they do not share a common theoretical model, nor do they adopt a comparative empirical perspective.
The Pre-conference Workshop: “Scenarios for China’s Future”
Rather, they seek to understand China from a historical-sociological institutionalist perspective. On the one hand, following the logic of path dependence, none of the authors predicts dramatic change in the short run. Instead, they insist that the status quo will generally persist. On the other hand, they identify various challenges confronting the Chinese state and society, both internally and externally.
Whether these challenges will develop into more threatening scenarios and how they will be dealt with seems vital to the future stability of China and its long-term development. However, both authors have come to the same conclusion that the party-state still claims its powerful domination and control over the gradual and limited expansion of civil society.
Nolan indicates that China will continue to be successful in weathering the storm of global financial crisis in the short term. However, since the Chinese economy has been deeply integrated into the global economy system, it will not be immune to external shocks. On the other hand, there is growing criticism of its indifference to issues of good governance such as corruption and human rights and to issues of responsible involvement as a great power in promoting global security.
- New Creation;
- La lingua speciale di Uri (illustrato) (Oscar junior) (Italian Edition).
- China’s journey toward becoming the second largest economy in the world.
- Explore our Catalog.
- The Negro Speaks of Rivers: Shmoop Poetry Guide.